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Abstract  
‘Pseudonymisation at source’ is the process of replacing personal identifiers with one or more 
pseudonymised identifiers prior to sharing or linkage of individual-level data.  This technique is 
sometimes used to safeguard privacy and to avoid legal restrictions during the processing of data with 
personal identifiers. A principal disadvantage, however, is less accurate linkage and the possibility of 
biased results disproportionately impacting disadvantaged groups. NHS Digital has now decided not 
to use pseudonymisation at source on a routine basis prior to data  linkage, but it is increasingly being 
used by local data services, and this is unnecessarily restrictive. To harness the potential of linked data 
for planning and managing services and research, we really need a diversity of trusted data linkage 
environments that can safely use identifiable, non-pseudonymised, data. Both within and outside the 
NHS we need suitable training in the skills to use sophisticated linkage methods, especially those 
associated with modern probabilistic linkage techniques to replace the restrictive ‘deterministic’ 
methods currently most commonly used in both the private and public sectors. 
 
  
Pseudonymisation is one element of a range of measures that can be used to protect the privacy of 
individuals. ‘Pseudonymisation at source’ is a technique used by data providers to avoid identification 
of individuals before data are linked for secondary uses such as service evaluation or research. The 
technique involves replacement of direct identifiers, known as ‘personal data’ or ‘confidential patient 
information’, such as NHS number, date of birth and postcode, with a pseudonym, which does not 
reveal a person’s real world identity. Use of the same pseudonymisation key for multiple data sources 
before data are shared enables data sources to be linked together without using ‘personal data’ and 
therefore avoids the need for patient consent or other legal provision under the Data Protection Act 
or the General Data Protection Regulation.(1). As we discuss below, however, this limits the utility and 
quality of any resulting linked datasets. 
In late 2015, the Health and Social Care Information Centre, now NHS Digital (NHSD), produced its 
final report with recommendations on the use of ‘pseudonymisation’ in the process of linking health 
records such as GP records and hospital episode statistics. The group charged with producing this had 
spent some three years extensively researching the literature and formulating a set of balanced 
recommendations to inform NHSD policy and practice regarding pseudonymisation and considering 
ways to safeguard individual privacy as well as allowing the full exploitation of linked data by 
researchers and others. In November 2017 NHSD announced that it would not be publishing the 
report. Copies of the minutes of the review group can be found at (2) and a response to a freedom of 
information request concerning reasons for non-publication can be found at (3). In March 2018, 
following a further freedom of information request that listed some of the key (unpublished) 
recommendations, NHSD did finally respond in some detail to these recommendations. (4). The text 
of the request and the response is reproduced in the Appendix. 
One of the key recommendations made by the review group concerned the use of pseudonymisation 
at source. The group recommended that for all new data flows into NHSD any proposal to use 
pseudonymisation at source would need to be fully justified, whilst existing data flows without 
pseudonymisation at source should continue. This recommendation has now been accepted by NHSD 
(4). 
This acceptance is important. As the review group recognised, it allows the implementation of 
probabilistic record linkage which is a key requirement for the development of high quality linkage 
across data from multiple sources in health and social care. Pseudonymisation at source means that 
linkage between data sets can only occur where  pseudonyms agree exactly, that is where there are 
no errors in the original patient identifiers used to create the pseudonym. The problem is that errors 
in coding identifiers occur in non-random fashion which means that failing to achieve a perfect match 
(agreement on pseudonyms) being associated with person characteristics (5). For example, records 
for patients who are socially disadvantaged may be less likely to link, which means their health needs 
or events, such as readmission or death, can be underestimated (5).  This problem is compounded 
when linking more than two datasets. 
NHSD is considering ways to address this problem in the context of creating an ongoing Master Patient 
Services facility for linking patient records across time and environments, that will be able to use 
probabilistic linkage methods to improve accuracy and reduce biases in subsequent analyses using the 
linked data (5). If implemented this could be an important advance, augmenting the purely 
‘deterministic’ procedures currently used. If data were pseudonymised at source, however, much of 
the benefit of such a facility would be lost by curtailing the possibilities for exploiting sophisticated 
linkage methods that utilise probabilistic procedures. 
NHS Digital is the statutory body for linking health data for England. However, many data linkages take 
place locally using local data, often in near real-time, to plan and manage services. Increasingly, 
pseudonymisation at source is being used to link data from hospitals, primary care, mental health and 
other services for indirect health care such as commissioning or monitoring of services. Commercial 
companies such as MedeAnalytics are performing the pseudonymisation and the analyses, under 
contract to local health bodies such as Clinical commissioning Groups (CCG) (See for example, 6, 7). As 
CCGs and local authorities come to rely on these local linkages to run services and target high risk 
patients, it becomes increasingly important to address linkage error to avoid certain groups falling 
through the net. As we have suggested, pseudonymisation at source is likely to constrain the utility of 
any linked data. A more rational solution is to improve linkage accuracy by avoiding pseudonymisation 
at source, and establishing regional and national trusted linkage environments with expertise able to 
use more sophisticated methods, including incorporating non-disclosive patient characteristics to 
improve and help to evaluate linkage accuracy (8). We are encouraged by the willingness of NHSD to 
consider the enhancement of its own in-house expertise (4) and its willingness to embrace new linkage 
methodologies should be an example to other groups working in this area. 
Data linkers also need to publish more details about how are processed and linked (9), and the Digital 
Innovation Hubs envisaged in the government’s Life Sciences Strategy may be one way forward (10). 
Use of probabilistic methods at local, regional and national levels would also enable wider linkages to 
data from schools and social care and could be coupled with feedback systems to improve identifier 
quality across sectors.  
 
 
Declaration of interest 





1. ICO anonymisation code. https://ico.org.uk/media/1061/anonymisation-code.pdf  
2. Pseudonymisation review. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/data-
pseudonymisation-review#history  
3. Freedom of information on non-publication. 
https://www.digital.nhs.uk/article/9256/Freedom-of-Information-request-NIC-156632-
X6S4F  
4. Reference: NIC-175129-D8K6W (not posted as of 31.03.2018).  
5. Hagger Johnson:  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26297363  
6.  Fair processing of data. http://www.enhertsccg.nhs.uk/how-we-use-information-about-you-
fair-processing-notice   
7. Data sharing. http://www.yaxleygp.nhs.uk/sharing-your-data-61035-htm   
8.  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29025131   
9. Ruth Gilbert1, Rosemary Lafferty, Gareth Hagger-Johnson1, Katie Harron2, Li-Chun Zhang3, 
Peter Smith3, Chris Dibben4, Harvey Goldstein (2017). GUILD: GUidance for Information about 
Linking Data sets. Journal of Public Health | pp. 1–8 | doi:10.1093/pubmed/fdx037 




 Appendix: NHSD response to FOI request 
 
 www.digital.nhs.uk enquiries@nhsdigital.nhs.uk  
 
1 Trevelyan Square  
Boar Lane  
Leeds LS1 6AE  
0300 303 5678  
5th March, 2018  
Our ref: NIC-175129-D8K6W  
 
Dear Harvey Goldstein 
 
Re: Information Request – Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 2000  
 
Thank you for your email dated 5th February 2018, requesting the following information:  
 
 
“Thank you for this reply. I now have a further FOI request that arises from this.  
 
You state "Instead, NHS Digital will be adopting many of the key recommendations of the 
Pseudonymisation Review internally alongside recommendations and requirements from the 
NDG Review, General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and other policy and legislation."  
I now request that you disclose precisely which recommendations NHS digital plans to adopt 
and when these will be implemented. Specifically I refer to the following recommendations that 
appeared in the final report sent to NHS digital in late 2015.  
 
1. Pseudonymisation on its own is insufficient to protect the confidentiality of patient data The 
HSCIC should provide training to HSCIC staff, the wider NHS and customers which covers 
the organisational, legal and technical implications of using pseudonymised, data, including 
the risks involved and legal penalties, prior to the sharing of data  
2. The HSCIC should develop an internal centre of expertise, which can provide best practice 
advice and guidance in relation to the de-identification of data, including pseudonymisation 
for itself and the wider NHS. This would include the development of relevant standards  
3. As a priority it should:  
 Develop specific criteria against which individual data collections by the HSCIC can be 
evaluated for the optimum usage of pseudonymisation in terms of the purpose of the data 
collection and respecting privacy.  
 
 Develop existing techniques for anonymisation to increase the utility of the data once its 
disseminated  
 
 Communicate to the public the results of this activity in understandable terms.  
 
4. Any new national data flow should be subject to IG review, through a Privacy Impact 
Assessment, and would involve patient groups where required. This should consider whether 
aggregate, fully anonymised or data pseudonymised at source could be used to meet the 
business objectives and realise the benefits to health and care, using data with the minimum 
risk of re-identification, to meet that purpose.  
4. At the point that a new national data flow into the HSCIC is identified where the benefits 
could be fully met under a pseudonymisation at source model a Proof of Concept should be 
initiated to prove the efficacy of this approach in relation to the HSCIC operating model.  
5. It is accepted that there are specific purposes for which the HSCIC needs to collect and 
process identifiable data, for example for probabilistic data linkage or clinical purposes. 
Existing National flows of identifiable data into the HSCIC should be subject to a rolling 
programme of regular review against specified criteria to ensure data flows in the least 
identifiable form necessary to meet the purpose. Each data flow should be reviewed in the 
light of legislative changes or significant technical developments, or if the requirements around 
individual flows change.  
Please would you also confirm that, for currently processed inbound data , there is no intention 
intention to apply pseudonymisation at source where this currently does not exist, unless, as 
in 4. above a Proof of Concept is initiated to demonstrate efficacy.  
 
Response by NHSD: 
 
We have considered your request and in accordance with S.1 (1) of the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000 (FOIA) I can confirm that we do hold the information that you have 
requested. Please see below responses to each question.  
1. Pseudonymisation on its own is insufficient to protect the confidentiality of patient data The 
HSCIC should provide training to HSCIC staff, the wider NHS and customers which covers 
the organisational, legal and technical implications of using pseudonymised, data, including 
the risks involved and legal penalties, prior to the sharing of data  
 
NHS Digital has adopted much of this recommendation and plans to adopt other elements. 
For the planned elements, timescales are listed where planning has reached that level of 
detail.  
NHS Digital follows the ICO Anonymisation: Code of Practice, which provides the definitive 
guidance on anonymisation, including the additional safeguards that must be met. Work has 
been undertaken to embed this across the organisation, including in the Data Access Request 
Service (DARS) and within the establishment of Independent Group Advising on the Release 
of Data (IGARD). Customers must meet stringent requirements for the sharing of data and 
data releases are restricted via the Data Sharing Contract and Data Sharing Agreements.  
This work has been reflected within the NHS Digital published data release registers  
http://content.digital.nhs.uk/dataregister.  
Support and guidance has also been made available to Information Asset Owners (IAOs) to 
help them assess the risks associated with data sharing.  
Further training around data sharing will be provided to NHS Digital staff particularly as we 
move towards meeting General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in May 2018.  
In the future, NHS Digital plans to publish an updated version of the Code of Practice on 
Confidential Information with clear requirements for the anonymisation of data, including the 
use of pseudonymised data. Any organisation that collects, analyses, publishes or 
disseminates confidential health and care information must have regard to this Code of 
Practice.  
Relevant content will be considered for inclusion in the forthcoming Data Security and 
Protection Toolkit and NHS Training Tool.  
2. The HSCIC should develop an internal centre of expertise, which can provide best practice 
advice and guidance in relation to the de-identification of data, including pseudonymisation 
for itself and the wider NHS. This would include the development of relevant standards  
As a priority it should:  
· Develop specific criteria against which individual data collections by the HSCIC can be 
evaluated for the optimum usage of pseudonymisation in terms of the purpose of the data 
collection and respecting privacy.  
· Develop existing techniques for anonymisation to increase the utility of the data once its 
disseminated  
· Communicate to the public the results of this activity in understandable terms.  
 
NHS Digital plans to adopt elements of this recommendation that can be met within its budget. 
It plans to further develop expertise in the de-identification of data, working with other 
stakeholders with relevant experience and expertise. The focus of any ‘centre of excellence’ 
is planned to be on the dissemination of data rather than collection.  
Over the past few years much of NHS Digital’s focus has been on developing the National 
Data Security Centre to manage cyber security threats and incidents and to provide advice to 
the wider system.  
In 2018, NHS Digital will look to procure a partner to develop a strategic de-identification (De-
ID) solution. The key objective of this procurement is to utilise industry-leading partner 
expertise to enable development of both a strategic solution and to drive up internal capability 
in this important field.  
 
3. Any new national data flow should be subject to IG review, through a Privacy Impact 
Assessment, and would involve patient groups where required. This should consider whether 
aggregate, fully anonymised or data pseudonymised at source could be used to meet the 
business objectives and realise the benefits to health and care, using data with the minimum 
risk of re-identification, to meet that purpose.  
 
NHS Digital has already adopted much of this recommendation and plans to adopt other 
elements.  
For new national data flows, proper review with relevant stakeholders is required in order to 
deliver the intended benefit in a secure and legal manner. The legal basis and information 
governance considerations for new flows into NHS Digital are already assured through the 
Data Coordination Board (DCB) process. Furthermore, where formally directed to establish a 
new data collection, NHS Digital would be legally obliged to collect information as specified 
within the Direction.  
NHS Digital notes that the ‘minimum risk of re-identification’ for information flowing into NHS 
Digital does not remove the need for identifiable data to flow. As a result of NHS Digital’s 
unique role and remit as the main safe haven for health and social care information, the 
majority of new national data flows are likely to include patient identifiers. In some instances, 
flows of anonymised or aggregate data will meet the business need e.g. Sexual and 
Reproductive Health Activity Data Set.  
As part of changes adopted by NHS Digital to meet GDPR requirements, all existing Privacy 
Impact Assessments are being reviewed. If still required, these will be replaced with new Data 
Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs), thus ensuring compliance with the latest data 
protection regulations. Where DPIAs are issued they will continue to be routinely assessed. 
For any new projects, systems or collections involving personal data, a DPIA will conducted. 
In many cases, elements will be published to support public transparency where this does not 
compromise security.   
 
4. At the point that a new national data flow into the HSCIC is identified where the benefits 
could be fully met under a pseuonymisation at source model a Proof of Concept should be 
initiated to prove the efficacy of this approach in relation to the HSCIC operating model.  
No plans have been developed on this. NHS Digital accepts that pseudonymisation at source 
has proved a useful mechanism, where receiving-organisations do not have a legal basis for 
receiving identifiable data but still need to be able to use the information.  
The concept of pseudonymisation at source is already well understood and proven. If NHS 
Digital is directed or receives a mandatory request to establish a new system or collection 
using data which is pseudonymised at source, this would be subject to testing.  
5. It is accepted that there are specific purposes for which the HSCIC needs to collect and 
process identifiable data, for example for probabilistic data linkage or clinical purposes. 
Existing National flows of identifiable data into the HSCIC should be subject to a rolling 
programme of regular review against specified criteria to ensure data flows in the least 
identifiable form necessary to meet the purpose. Each data flow should be reviewed in the 
light of legislative changes or significant technical developments, or if the requirements around 
individual flows change.  
 
Elements of this recommendation have been implemented through data collections being 
reviewed via DPIAs.  
DPIAs must be kept under review. As a minimum, the DPIA should be reviewed where 
changes may present a risk to the data subject's rights and freedoms. This may include 
changes to relevant legislature, significant technical developments or changes to the 
underlying requirements for a particular flow.  
 
Please would you also confirm that, for currently processed inbound data , there is no intention 
to apply pseudonymisation at source where this currently does not exist, unless, as in 4. above 
a Proof of Concept is initiated to demonstrate efficacy.  
 
NHS Digital confirms it has no current plans to apply pseudonymisation at source to existing 
collections. There are also no current plans to apply it to any new data collections, however, 
this is an option that would be considered when establishing any new system or data 
collection.  
Any new systems and/or collections established by NHS Digital will be by the result of a 
Direction from Secretary of State or NHS England. NHS Digital will only establish new systems 
or collections in accordance with the stipulations of such new Directions – whether that be for 
the collection of data that is identifiable, pseudonymised at source or anonymised.  
NHS Digital will undertake testing to demonstrate the efficacy of the new system and/or 
collection.  
 
In line with the Information Commissioner’s directive on the disclosure of information under 
the Freedom of Information Act 2000 your request will form part of our disclosure log. 
Therefore, a version of our response which will protect your anonymity will be posted on the 
NHS Digital website.  
I trust you are satisfied with our response to your request for information. However, if you are 
not satisfied, you may request a review from a suitably qualified member of staff not involved 
in the initial query, via the enquiries@nhsdigital.nhs.uk email address or by post at the above 
postal address.  
Your request to NHS Digital will now be closed on our internal CRM (customer relationship 
management) system.  
Yours sincerely,  
 
J Dzakpata  
Information Assurance Advisor  
 
 
 
